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Abstract: 
This paper examines if the European integration process, by transferring policy instruments to 
supra-national authorities, has affected voters’ evaluations of governments’ economic 
performance at electoral periods. The analysis is implemented on a panel of 15 EU countries, from 
1970 to 2011. Results suggest that before the Maastricht Treaty, citizens held incumbents 
responsible for GDP growth, and for the evolution of inflation, particularly when measured relative 
to the EU average. After the Maastricht Treaty, only fiscal policy variables show up as statistically 
significant. The capacity to control the budget deficit appears as the main determinant of electoral 
results, especially during the current economic crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
An important question in political economy is how economic events affect voting behavior. 
Although there is a vast literature on the topic,1 there is still a lively debate on how, and under 
which circumstances, economic performance has a greater effect on electoral results. The present 
paper intends to contribute to this literature by investigating whether the European integration 
process, by transferring policy instruments to supranational entities, and restricting the national 
government’ ability to influence the economy, has conditioned citizens’ assessments of political 
responsibility for economic outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, this topic has never been 
investigated. 
Using election and economic data for thirteen Western European countries from 1960 to 
1997, Chappell and Veiga (2000) assessed the relative performance of vote functions motivated by 
alternative economic paradigms, taking into account variations in the extent to which incumbent 
parties are held accountable for economic outcomes. They presumed that different 
macroeconomic theories can be thought of as a description of relevant feasibility constraints for 
policymaking. Therefore, performance assessments by voters of incumbent politicians should 
differ under differing perceptions about the correctness of alternative theories. Building on their 
work, the present paper focuses on the institutional changes that occurred in European countries 
in order to create the monetary union. It investigates which economic indicators have greater 
influence on the outcome of elections, using an enlarged and updated sample comprising the first 
15 countries joining the European Union, and covering the period from 1970 until 2011. Did the 
European integration process change the way voters hold the government responsible for the 
behavior of different economic variables? Do their evaluations take into account deviations from 
the average performance of the EU? Is the budget deficit more relevant after the Maastricht 
Treaty than before? Did the current sovereign debt crisis have an impact on voters’ judgments? 
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Does the electorate of countries currently under international financial assistance behave 
differently from that of the other countries? As far as we know, these questions remain 
unanswered in the literature. Furthermore, the current sovereign debt crisis that several European 
countries are facing, and the inability of European leaders to overcome it, renders the discussion 
on fiscal conservatism of voters (Peltzman, 1992) particularly important. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents a review of 
the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the sources of data and the empirical model 
specification. Section 4 discusses the empirical results for the baseline models. Section 5 addresses 
the question of whether the Maastricht Treaty changed economic voting. In section 6 we analyze 
countries that are currently under financial assistance programs agreed with the IMF and the EU. 
The last section concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
Although most scholars agree that economics matters for electoral outcomes (Paldam 1991), 
the relative effects are not equal across countries or time (Lewis-Beck 1988), and several 
arguments have been presented to explain such differences. Working on a sample of 17 
democracies from 1948 to 1985, Paldam and Høst (1990) rejected the hypothesis that there is an 
international element in the vote. Their results indicate that electoral outcomes in different 
countries are not affected by international opinion swings to the right or to the left. Powell and 
Whitten (1993) argued that the partisan nature of the government, its electoral base, and the 
clarity of its political responsibility are fundamental to understand the effect of economic 
performance on voting.  According to Pacek and Radcliff (1995), the level of the welfare state plays 
a major role in the relationship between economic conditions and the vote. They found that 
incumbents in countries with high levels of welfare spending are more insolated against the 
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business cycle. Chappell and Veiga (2000) advocate that voters’ assessments of incumbents’ 
performance depend on what is deemed feasible by voters, as well as to what is desirable. Since 
macroeconomic theories have implications for feasibility constraints, voters’ perceptions about 
the correctiveness of alternative theories may influence their judgment of politicians’ 
performance.   
Brender and Drazen (2008), analyzed if voter behavior is different in new versus old 
democracies and in developed versus less developed countries. Working with a large panel of 
democracies, they concluded that higher growth rates of GDP per capita are associated with 
higher probabilities of re-election only in the less developed countries and in the new 
democracies. They also found that increases in the government’s budget deficits do not help its 
reelection. Moreover, in developed countries with established democracies, they are punished at 
the polls. This result is in line with Alesina et al. (2012), who studied the electoral consequences of 
large fiscal adjustments in 19 OECD countries from 1975 to 2008. Their results indicate that 
governments which quickly reduce the budget deficit are not systematically voted out of office, 
and there is some evidence that fiscally loose governments tend to lose elections more often than 
average. 
For studies focusing on single countries, there is mixed evidence on the effect of fiscal policy 
on electoral results at the national and sub-national levels. Examples of studies reporting evidence 
that voters are fiscally conservative are Peltzman (1992) for the US, Brender (2003) for Israel, and 
Drazen and Eslava (2010) for Columbia. However, other papers, such as Akhmedov and 
Zhuravskaya (2004) for Russia, Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) for Brazil, Veiga and Veiga (2007) 
and Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011) for Portugal, and Jones et al. (2012) for Argentina found that 
opportunistic fiscal policies (Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Rogoff 1990) pay off in subsequent elections. 
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The reason to suppose that fiscal consolidations are penalized by voters is that they imply 
increases in tax revenue or decreases in expenditures that, according to Keynesian theory, will 
generate a temporary downturn in the economy. However, in economies where the size of 
governments is high, and especially in countries with persistent deficits and high public debt, 
citizens may perceive fiscal consolidations as necessary, in order to avoid inefficiencies in the 
public sector and the onset of debt crisis. If loose fiscal policy is considered harmful, the electorate 
will punish, rather than reward, such policy at the polls. Voters perceive that there is a limit to the 
common-poll resource and, if more outlays are demanded, the associated cost would not be 
transferred to other tax payers, but rather paid by them. 
In the Western European context, there is an additional reason for governments not to be 
punished by restrictive fiscal policies. The signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which 
established the convergence criteria that countries needed to fulfill in order to join the monetary 
union, and later on the Stability and Growth Pact, gave governments an excuse for being fiscally 
conservative: the need to comply with supranational agreements that imposed limits to fiscal 
deficits and debt. The main purpose of the current paper is to investigate if the European 
integration process has changed citizens’ assessment of governments’ economic performance at 
the ballot box. Instead of estimating the probability of government terminations, as in Brender 
and Drazen (2008) or Alesina et al. (2012), we prefer to estimate vote functions. They are more 
sensitive to changes in popular support for incumbents, since governments can lose votes from 
one election to another but still be re-elected.  
 
3. Data and empirical model specification  
Our dataset covers the first 15 countries joining the EU, from 1970 to 2011. Data for the political 
variables was extracted from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions – DPI (see Beck et 
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al. 2001). Unemployment rates, inflation rates, real GDP, and government net lending as 
percentage of GDP were obtained from the OECD’s statistics.  All variables are quarterly, except 
for government net lending, which has an annual frequency and was linearly interpolated to 
generate quarterly data. The use of quarterly data allows for a more precise test of electoral 
effects of economic conditions. It avoids the arbitrary decision of considering elections that 
occurred in the first part of year t as falling in the calendar of year t-1, as in Alesina et al. (2012). 
Information on election dates and the first quarter of data for the main economic variables is 
provided in Appendix Table A-1.  
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 
1. The least voted government in the sample was a single party government that ruled after the 
1973 Danish election, with only 12.3% of the votes. Most governments in the sample are coalitions 
(63%) and have a majority of deputies in Parliament (75%). The average number of quarters since 
the last change in the party composition of the government is 19.91 (roughly 5 years), equal to the 
average time in office of the prime-minister. When time in office is measured by the number of 
quarters the main party stayed in office, the average increases to 41.81 quarters (over 10 years). 
Regarding the economic variables, the average net lending of government is negative of 2.9% of 
GDP, with the maximum deficit (-26%) registered in Ireland in 2011 and the maximum surplus 
(6.14% of GDP) occurred in Sweden in 1976. There has been a progressive reduction of inflation 
during the period considered, and the average annual growth rate of real GDP (from the same 
quarter of the previous year) was 2.48%. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
The baseline empirical model can be specified as follows: 
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Vit = Pol + Eco + fi + eit                      (1) 
The dependent variable (Vit) is the percentage of votes obtained by the parties in 
government in country i and election t. Since several governments in the sample are coalitions of 
several parties, in alternative specifications we also use as dependent variable the percentage of 
votes obtained by the main incumbent party. The right-hand side of the equation includes a vector 
of political variables (Pol) and a vector of economic variables (Eco). fi is the individual effect of 
country i, which captures country differences that remain stable over time, namely political 
institutions. and  represent vectors of parameters to be estimated. And finally, eit is the error 
term. 
The vector of political variables takes into account the base support of the incumbent 
when elected (Vit-1), whether it is a coalition or not (Coalit), if it is supported by a majority of 
deputies in the Parliament or not (Majit), and the number of quarters in power. Three alternative 
specifications were used to measure tenure: main party in office (Quartersit), prime-minister in 
office (Primeit) and the number of quarters since the last change in the party composition of 
government (GovChangeit). Governments with a larger base support are likely to obtain higher 
percentages of votes in the next election. A negative coefficient is expected for the dummy 
associated with coalitions due to conflicts among parties forming government. Time in office is 
likely to decrease incumbent’s popularity, as promises presented before elections are not fulfilled, 
and scandals and decisions that hurt groups of the population accumulate. According to Paldam 
and Skott (1995), the cost of ruling may reflect a rational demand for change by voters who want 
to see new faces in office.   
 The economic performance of the countries is captured by unemployment rates (Unempit-
1), changes in annual inflation rates (Change_Infit), and annual real GDP growth rates (GDP_git-1). 
The fiscal regressor is the government’s net lending as a percentage of GDP2 (Surplusit-1). All 
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variables were lagged one quarter because data is released with a lag by statistical bureaus, and 
may not be immediately perceived by citizens. Unemployment, inflation, and lower GDP growth 
rates are expected to decrease votes for the incumbent. As for the budget balance, we have no 
prior regarding to the sign of the estimated coefficient in the first years of the sample: a negative 
sign would suggest that citizens reward loose fiscal policies (deficits), while a positive sign 
indicates that voters are fiscally conservative. However, for the post-Maastricht Treaty period we 
expect this variable to be positively signed, due to the fiscal surveillance mechanisms created by 
European countries in order to achieve the economic and monetary union and, later on, to 
facilitate and maintain its stability.  To test whether voters take into account the performance of 
other EU countries when evaluating their national government, the national economic variables 
were also measured as differences from the EU-15 average.   
 Because the dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 100 percent, but the 
independent variables are not, the estimated model may predict a percentage of votes that lies 
outside of the [0,100] boundaries. To overcome this problem, a logistic transformation of the 
dependent variable was implemented. The regression model takes the following form: 
log(Vit/100-Vit) = Pol + Eco + fi +                     (2)  
 
To obtain the marginal impact of an explanatory variable (x) on the dependent variable (Y), the 
estimated coefficient () needs to be transformed according to the following formula: 
Y/x = *Y*1-Y/100).                     (3) 
 
4. Empirical results for the baseline models 
The baseline empirical model was firstly estimated by fixed effects (FE), in order to take into 
account country differences that remain stable over time, namely political institutions.3 Since the 
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number of voters varies considerably among the countries included in the sample, the model was 
also estimated by Weighted Least Squares (WLS). The FE model attributes the same weight to all 
observations, but 49 million citizens voted in the German election of 1998, while in the 
Luxemburg’s balloting of 1984, the electorate was only of 174 thousand (these are the two 
extremes in the dataset). Although the voter’s decision to support or not the incumbent parties is 
discrete, what is observed is the percentage of times this choice is made, which is continuous. 
Following McFadden (1981), this information can be interpreted as if it was produced by a 
representative voter repeatedly making this choice. Therefore, the estimation of equation (2) 
requires special treatment for the aggregate time-series cross-sectional nature of the data. The 
percentage of votes for the parties in government in a large country is an estimator of the 
population mean with lower variance than the percentage of votes for the incumbent parties in a 
smaller country. The variance of the error term (it) is not constant, it decreases with the number 
of voters in country i and election t (Nit). Thus, to obtain a vote function of the representative 
voter in Europe, the model was estimated by WLS.4  
 Results for models using as dependent variable the logistic transformation of the 
percentage of votes obtained by all parties forming government are reported in table 2. All 
estimated coefficients show the expected signs. Voters reward GDP growth and positive budget 
balances,5 and dislike increases in inflation and inflation above the EU average. This result for 
inflation is in line with Chappell and Veiga (2000), who also found European voters to be 
particularly sensitive to changes in inflation, especially when measured relative to the European 
average. When we use the WLS estimation procedure, the marginal impact of GDP growth on 
votes increases considerably, while the effect of inflation decreases. This suggests that the 
importance attributed to economic variables by voters living in larger countries differs from those 
living in smaller nations.6  
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[Table 2] 
 
Regarding political variables, governments with a larger base support (percentage of votes 
in previous election) tend to receive more votes in the subsequent election. Coalition and majority 
governments receive larger percentages of votes than single party/minority governments. A 
possible explanation for a coalition government to behave better in subsequent elections is a 
transfer of votes from one member of the coalition to another, canceling out the aggregate effect. 
When using the WLS, there is evidence of erosion of government popularity as time in power 
increases. Three alternative specifications were used to measure tenure: main party in office 
(Quartersit), prime-minister in office (Primeit) and the number of quarters since the last change in 
the party composition of the government (GovChangeit). Only the results for the last specification 
are reported in the table, because this is the one that turned out to be statistically significant more 
frequently. 
Because many governments in our sample (63%) are coalitions of parties, and the main 
party in office typically plays a key role in policy decisions, it is likely that voters regard it as more 
responsible for the evolution of the economy. Furthermore, in some occasions there were changes 
between elections in the party composition of coalition governments. To take these aspects into 
account, Table 3 presents estimation results for regressions using as dependent variable the 
logistic transformation of the percentage of votes obtained by the main party in office. For the 
economic variables, results are very similar to those presented in the previous table. Voters 
reward the main party in office for positive budget balances, increases in the GDP growth rate and 
reductions in inflation.  When the economic variables are measured as differences from EU 
averages, there is evidence that voters dislike inflation above the EU average. There is strong 
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evidence of persistence of votes from one election to the next and of erosion of the main party’s 
support as time in office accumulates. The dummies for majority and coalition governments 
turned out not to be statistically significant. 
 
[Table 3] 
  
5. The Maastricht Treaty’s impact on economic voting 
In this section, we explore whether changes in European institutions over time, particularly those 
associated with the Maastricht Treaty, changed the way voters judge incumbent governments. 
The Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992 by the members of the European Community in 
Maastricht, Netherlands, and came into force on November 1st, 1993. It defined the five 
convergence criteria that countries needed to comply with in order to move on to the third phase 
of European Monetary Union (EMU), and adopt the euro in 1999. The conditions that are closer to 
the economic variables used in our empirical analysis are the price stability criterion and the two 
criteria for public finance stability. The inflation criterion established that the country’s inflation 
rate should be no more than 1.5 percentage points higher than the average inflation rate of the 
three best performing member states of the EU. The budgetary criteria set a limit to the public 
deficit and public debt to GDP of, respectively, 3% and 60%. After the treaty’s signature, more 
information became available for voters regarding the economic situation of their country, and, 
particularly, on the performance of other candidate countries to EMU. It is likely that voters 
became more aware of the fiscal variables and more fiscally conservative, since the adoption of 
policies to consolidate the budget would be regarded as necessary to guarantee the country’s 
qualification to the third stage of the European Monetary Union. The coming into force of the 
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Stability and Growth Pact in 1999 reinforced the fiscal monitoring of EU members by European 
Institutions. It is, therefore, plausible that voters’ awareness of the fiscal performance of their 
countries continued later on. Furthermore, the integration process restricted national 
governments’ policies to European goals and, with the creation of the single currency, monetary 
policy decision making was transferred to the European Central Bank. 
To test if the Maastricht Treaty changed the way voters evaluate politicians’ economic 
performance, two dummies for the periods before (Before_MTit) and after (After_MTit) the 
Maastricht Treaty (1994 onwards) were created.7 These two dummies were interacted with each 
economic variable included in the empirical work. Results for the logistic transformation of the 
percentage of votes for the government are presented in Table 4.8 There is evidence of a change in 
voters’ attitudes due to the Maastricht Treaty. Before it, citizens rewarded increases in the GDP 
growth rate, reductions in inflation, and downside deviations of this variable from the EU average. 
After the Maastricht Treaty, fiscal variables became more important: among the economic 
variables, only the budget surplus and its deviations from the EU average are statistically 
significant. This suggests that voters became more fiscally conservative, which is in line with the 
results obtained by Brender and Drazen (2008) for developed countries with established 
democracies, and by Alesina et al. (2012) for OECD countries. The commitment to fulfill the 
Maastricht convergence criteria by incumbent parties and also by the opposition, led to a 
consensus on fiscal consolidation measures. Apparently, the electorate understood the 
advantages of adopting the euro and the need for fiscal consolidation. This is in accordance with 
Ferejohn (1986), who suggested that governments may justify the need to implement unpopular 
policies with external negative economic conditions or constraints outside their control. 
Therefore, even after the creation of the monetary union, national governments could blame 
European institutions and rules, namely the Stability and Growth Pact, for restrictive fiscal policies, 
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and thus avoid been punished at the ballot box. The transfer of policy instruments to 
supranational entities, particularly the European Central Bank (ECB), may also justify the loss of 
statistical significance of the variables associated with inflation and GDP growth. With monetary 
policy being conducted by the ECB, national governments have very limited power to influence 
prices. Another aspect that worth emphasizing is that, in our sample, average inflation before the 
Maastricht Treaty was 8.4%, while after it was substantially lower (2.2%). It is likely that voters 
attributed higher importance to changes in inflation before the Maastricht Treaty because its level 
was substantially higher than after the Treaty.     
 
[Table 4] 
 
 The period analyzed (1970-2011) covers the most recent global financial crisis, which led 
to a substantial increase in budget deficits9 and to sovereign debt crisis in several EU countries. It 
is likely that the crisis had an impact on voters’ evaluations, increasing their concerns for public 
deficits. In order to test this hypothesis, a dummy for the 2008-2011 years was created, and 
interacted with the economic variables. Results for fixed effects estimations are shown in columns 
3 and 6 of Table 4. As in columns 1 and 4, before the Maastricht Treaty voters held incumbents 
accountable for changes in inflation and GDP growth. However, for the post Maastricht Treaty 
period, it is now evident that the budget deficit only becomes relevant during the 2008-2011 
period. Difficulties in obtaining external funding by several European governments, increases in 
sovereign debt interest rates, and fear of the consequences of insolvency of several EU members, 
led citizens to pay special attention to the public finances, and to punish incumbents for loose 
fiscal policy.     
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6. Are Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain different? 
This section investigates if the electorates of countries that are currently under financial assistance 
programs10 react differently to economic outcomes and fiscal policy. Results presented in Table 5 
are similar to those of Table 4. Before the Maastricht Treaty, voters punished incumbents for 
increases in inflation and for inflation above the EU average, and they rewarded GDP growth; after 
the Treaty, they focused their attention on fiscal policy, and showed dislike for deficits. However, 
two differences deserve to be highlighted. First, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients for 
the statistically significant variables is substantially higher than in similar regressions for the whole 
sample. This is not surprising if we take into account that average inflation and deficits in these 
countries were almost twice the sample averages (see appendix B). Second, in these four 
countries, voters held incumbents responsible for government net lending even before the 
Maastricht Treaty, favoring politicians who delivered lower deficits, and deficits below the EU 
average. These results may be justified by the fact that the average deficit before the Treaty in 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain was 5.38% of GDP, much higher than for the overall sample 
(2.93%). Thus, high deficits were a more salient economic problem in these four countries than in 
the other eleven. 
 
[Table 5] 
 
Conclusions 
The first conclusion to extract from this study is that the economy matters for electoral results. 
Governments that are able to deliver high GDP growth, price stability, and lower budget deficits 
are rewarded at the ballet box. The statistical significance of these variables is larger than in most 
of the previous studies of vote functions using panels of countries. 
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Secondly, the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty, in which European countries 
established their commitment to create a monetary union, changed voters’ evaluations of 
government economic performance. The need to comply with the convergence criteria to join the 
EMU, and later on the transfer of monetary policy to the ECB, insolated governments from the 
business cycle. While before the Treaty changes in inflation, deviations of national inflation from 
the EU-15 average, and GDP growth determined electoral results, after it, only the budget deficit is 
statistically significant. It is also possible that voters attribute greater importance to the economic 
variable that they perceive as being the main problem of the nation. While for the period 1970 to 
1993, average inflation was 8.4%, for the subsequent period it has been much smaller (2.2%). 
More recently, the substantial rises in budget deficits and the current sovereign debt crisis that 
several European countries are facing increased the importance voters attribute to fiscal policy 
decision making.    
Thirdly, empirical results for the sub-sample of countries currently under an international 
assistance program reveal that these countries’ voters reacted more severely to economic 
variables, and that the budget deficit was a relevant variable in their electoral choices even before 
the Maastricht Treaty. These results reinforce our argument that citizens hold incumbents more 
responsible for the economic variables that they perceive as being problematic and which 
therefore, may have a stronger impact on their well-being.      
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1 For surveys on economic voting see Nannestad and Paldam (1994), Paldam (2004), Brug et al. (2007), and 
Duch and Stevenson (2008).  
2
 Although the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance would be more adequate to monitor the fiscal 
situation of the country, the budget balance is more easily followed by the general public.  
3 An F-test rejects the hypothesis of the country dummies being jointly insignificant. The results of a 
Hausman test reveal that the fixed effects model is preferable to a random effects model. 
4 For applications of this method see Dubin and Kalsow (1996), Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães (2010), and 
Martins and Veiga (2011).  
5 Changes in the budget surplus were also tested but turned out not to be statistically significant. 
6
 Unemployment rates, changes in unemployment and differences from EU averages were also tried in the 
regressions but rarely turned out as statistically significant. Furthermore, the number of observations for the 
unemployment rate is substantially smaller (see appendix A), thus reducing the number of degrees of 
freedom.  
7 For Austria, Finland and Sweden, the dummy for the after Maastricht period only starts assuming the value 
of one in 1995, when these countries joined the European Union. 
8 Results for the logistic transformation of the percentage of votes for the main party are very similar. They 
are available from the author upon request. 
9 In the sample (see Appendix B), the average for the deficit as percentage of GDP during the period 2008-
2011 was 5.98%, much higher than the average for the overall sample (2.91%). 
10 Financial assistance to Spain currently involves only the banking system. 
17 
 
Acknowledgements 
The author thanks Francisco Veiga and participants at the Martin Paldam Workshop for valuable 
comments. The financial support provided by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and 
Technology (FCT), under research grant PTDC/EGE-ECO/118501/2010 (partially funded by FEDER) 
in gratefully acknowledged. The article also benefited from the efficient research assistance of 
Hélder Alves. 
  
18 
 
References 
Aguiar-Conraria, L. & Magalhães, P. (2010). Referendum design, quorum rules and turnout. Public 
Choice 144: 63-81. 
Aidt, T., Veiga, F. & Veiga, L. (2011). Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the 
rational political business cycle model. Public Choice 148: 21-44. 
Akhmedov, A. & Zhuravskaya, E. (2004). Opportunistic political cycles: Test in a young democracy 
setting. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 1301-1338. 
Alesina, A., Carloni, D. & Lecce, G. (2012). The electoral consequences of large fiscal adjustments. 
NBER Working Paper 17655. 
Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P. & Walsh, P. (2001). New tools in comparative political 
economy: The Database of Political Institutions. World Bank Economic Review 15(1): 165-176.  
Brender, A. (2003). The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in Israel: 
1989-1998. Journal of Public Economics 87: 2187-2205. 
Brender, A. & Drazen A. (2008). How do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection 
prospects? Evidence from a large panel of countries. American Economic Review 98(5): 2203–
2220. 
Brug, W., Eijk, C. & Franklin, M. (2007). The Economy and the Vote: Economic Conditions and 
Elections in Fifteen Countries. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Chappell, W. & Veiga, L. (2000). Economics and elections in Western Europe: 1960-1997. Electoral 
Studies 19: 183-197. 
Drazen, A. & Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and 
evidence. Journal of Development Economics 92(1): 39-52. 
19 
 
Dubin, J. & Kalsow, G.A. (1996). Comparing absentee and precinct voters: A view over time. 
Political Behavior 18(4): 369-392. 
Duch , R.M. & Stevenson, R.T. (2008). The Economic Vote – How Political Institutions Condition 
Election Results. Cambridge University Press: New York – USA. 
Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice 50: 5-25. 
Jones, M.P., Meloni, O. & Tommasi, M. (2012). Voters as fiscal liberals: Incentives and 
accountability in federal systems. Economics & Politics 24(2): 135-156. 
Lewis-Beck, M. (1988). Economics and elections: The major Western Democracies. University of 
Michigan Press: Ann Arbor. 
McFadden, D. (1981). Econometric models of probabilistic choice. In Manski, C.F. & McFadden, D. 
(eds.). Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications. MIT Press: 
Cambridge, Ma. 
Martins, R. & Veiga, F. (forthcoming). Economic voting in Portuguese municipal elections. Public 
Choice. DOI 10.1007/s11127-011-9849-0.   
Nannested, P. & Paldam, M. (1994).  The VP-function: A survey of the literature on vote and 
popularity functions after 25 years. Public Choice 94(79): 213-245.  
Pacek, A. & Radcliff, B. (1995). Economic voting and the welfare state: A cross-national analysis. 
Journal of Politics 57(1): 44-61. 
Paldam, M. (1991). How robust is the vote function? A study of seventeen nations over four 
decades. In Norpoth, H., Lewis-Beck, M. & Lay, J. (eds) Economics and Politics: The calculus of 
support,  9-32. University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor. 
20 
 
Paldam, M. (2004). Are vote and popularity functions economically correct? In Rowley, C. K. & 
Schneider, F. (eds.) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice I: 49-59. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Paldam, M. & Høst, V. (1990). An international element in the vote? A comparative study of 17 
OECD countries 1948–85. European Journal of Political Research 18(2): 221–239. 
Paldam, M. & Skott, P. (1995). A rational-voter explanation of the cost of ruling. Public Choice 83: 
159-172.  
Peltzman, S. (1992). Voters as fiscal conservatives. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107: 325-345. 
Powell, G.B. Jr. & Whitten, G.D. (1993). A cross-national analysis of economic voting: taking 
account of the political context. American Journal of Political Science 37(2): 391-414. 
Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review 80: 21–36. 
Rogoff, K. & Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. Review of Economics 
Studies 55: 1–16. 
Sakurai, S. & Menezes-Filho, N. (2008). Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities. 
Public Choice 137: 301-314. 
Veiga, L. & Veiga, F. (2007). Does opportunism pay-off? Economics Letters 96(2): 177-182. 
 
 
 
  
21 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable No Obs. Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max 
% Votes incumbent gov. (VGit) 173 44.43 10.37 6.85 72.62 
% Votes incumbent gov. lag (VGit-1) 173 48.25 9.72 12.3 84.42 
% Votes main party in gov. (VMPit) 173 32.55 9.86 6.85 51.03 
% Votes main party in gov. lag (VMPit-1) 173 35.28 10.03 10.6 62 
Coallition (Coalit) 173 .63 .48 0 1 
Majority of deputies in Parliament (Majit) 173 .75 .44 0 1 
Quarters in office - Main party (Quartersit) 176 41.81 43.63 2 214 
Quarters in office – Prime minister (Primeit) 176 19.91 16.99 1 115 
Quarters since the last change in the party 
composition of the government (GovChangeit) 
176 19.91 14.70 2 76 
National values      
   Government Net Lending (GovNetLendit) 158 -2.91 4.50 -26.07 6.14 
   Change in inflation (Change_infit) 178 -.51 2.64 -12.18 7.91 
   Annual real GDP growth rate (GDP_git) 179 2.48 2.90 -9.50 14.10 
Difference from EU averages      
   Government Net Lending 158 -.15 3.79 -19.53 8.42 
   Change in inflation 178 -.11 3.57 -9.38 13.62 
   Annual real GDP growth rate 178 -.06 1.93 -6.55 10.19 
Sources: DPI (World Bank) and OECD Stat. 
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Table 2.  Determinants of the percentage of votes for the Government  
 National values  Differences from EU-15 averages 
 FE  WLS  FE  WLS 
 Coeffs 
(t-stat) 
Marginal 
effects 
 Coeffs 
(t-stat) 
Marginal 
effects 
 Coeffs 
(t-stat) 
 Coeffs 
(t-stat) 
Vit-1 0.594*** 14,67  0.728*** 17,96  0.591***  0.695*** 
 (6.89)   (9.04)   (6.23)  (8.59) 
Majit 0.027 0,67  0.124** 3,05  0.021  0.121* 
 (0.44)   (2.01)   (0.29)  (1.91) 
Coalit 0.123** 3,03  0.099* 2,45  0.144**  0.075 
 (2.24)   (1.81)   (2.39)  (1.31) 
GovChangeit -0.003 -0,08  -0.003** -0,07  -0.003  -0.003* 
 (-1.75)   (-2.04)   (-1.53)  (-1.88) 
Surplusit-1 0.019** 0,47  0.012* 0,30  0.024*  0.002 
 (2.534)   (1.88)   (2.10)  (0.29) 
Change_infit -0.021*** -0,51  -0.004 -0,09  -0.015*  -0.017* 
 (-3.33)   (-0.33)   (-1.92)  (-1.90) 
GDP_git-1 0.016** 0,41  0.025** 0,61  0.007  0.019 
 (2.86)   (2.36)   (0.58)  (1.18) 
Constant -0.211** -5,21  -0.287*** -7,07  -0.238**  -0.275*** 
 (-2.87)   (-3.60)   (-2.87)  (-3.82) 
          
Observations 154   154   154  154 
Adj. R-squared 0.46   0.72   0.43  0.71 
Countries 15   15   15  15 
Notes:   * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.  
 The coefficients for country dummies are not reported. 
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Table 3. Determinants of the percentage of votes for the main party in office 
 
 National values  Differences from EU-15 averages 
 FE  WLS  FE  WLS 
 Coeffs 
(t-stat) 
Marginal 
effects 
 Coeffs 
(t-stat) 
Marginal 
effects 
 Coeffs 
(t-stat) 
 Coeffs 
(t-stat) 
Vit-1 0.759*** 18,74  0.879*** 21,71  0.740***  0.868*** 
 (9.43)    (12.70)    (8.49)  (12.12) 
Majit 0.002 0,04  0.083 2,06  0.002  0.073 
 (0.02)    (1.43)    (0.03)  (1.23) 
Coalit -0.102 -2,53  -0.002 -0,06  -0.083  -0.039 
 (-1.05)    (-0.04)    (-0.87)  (-0.62) 
GovChangeit -0.004*** -0,11  -0.002* -0,06  -0.004**  -0.002 
 (-3.28)    (-1.76)    (-2.73)  (-1.54) 
Surplusit-1 0.016* 0,40  0.015** 0,36  0.017  0.003 
 (2.09)    (2.27)    (1.24)  (0.37) 
Change_infit -0.023** -0,58  -0.008 -0,20  -0.022**  -0.019** 
 (-2.78)    (-0.74)    (-2.24)  (-2.17) 
GDP_git-1 0.019** 0,49  0.019* 0,47  0.004  0.016 
 (2.63)    (1.84)    (0.20)  (0.95) 
Constant -0.141 -3,50  -0.204** -5,04  -0.175*  -0.205*** 
 (-1.63)   (-2.51)   (-1.83)  (-2.906) 
          
Observations 154   154   154  154 
Adj. R-squared 0.47   0.65   0.44  0.64 
Countries 15   15   15  15 
Notes:   * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.  
 The coefficients for country dummies are not reported. 
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Table 4. Before and after the Maastricht Treaty (% of votes for the government) 
 National values  Differences from EU-15 averages 
 FE  WLS  FE  FE  WLS  FE 
Before the MT            
 Before_MTit*Surplusit-1 0.009  0.01  0.008  0.007  -0.004  0.004 
 (1.23)  (1.43)  (1.09)  (1.03)  (-0.40)  (0.57) 
 Before_MTit *Change_infit -0.01**  -0.005  -0.01**  -0.02**  -0.02**  -0.02** 
 (-2.64)  (-0.49)  (-2.29)  (-2.62)  (-2.28)  (-2.54) 
 Before_MTit *GDP_git-1 0.02**  0.02*  0.01*  -0.005  0.007  -0.006 
 (2.40)  (1.84)  (2.03)  (-0.36)  (0.40)  (-0.39) 
After the MT            
 After_MTit* Surplusit-1 0.029***  0.02**  0.01  0.03***  0.02  0.01 
 (4.30)  (2.05)  (0.75)  (3.28)  (1.02)  (0.80) 
 After_MTit*Change_infit -0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01 
 (-1.10)  (0.87)  (0.50)  (0.74)  (0.77)  (0.41) 
 After_MTit*GDP_git-1 0.006  0.01  0.003  0.007  0.03  0.01 
 (0.68)  (0.80)  (0.25)  (0.36)  (1.02)  (0.60) 
Crisis 2008-2011            
 Crisisit* Surplusit-1     0.03**      0.03** 
     (2.49)      (2.62) 
 Crisisit*Change_infit     -0.01      0.05 
     (-0.22)      (0.69) 
 Crisisit*GDP_git-1     -0.01      -0.04 
     (-0.37)      (-0.96) 
            
Observations 154  154  154  154  154  154 
Adj. R-squared 0.39  0.71   0.38  0.37  0.70  0.36 
Countries 15  15  15  15  15  15 
Notes:  T-statistics are between parentheses. 
 * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.  
 The coefficients for country dummies are not reported. 
 The explanatory variables used in all specifications are the same as those reported in Table 2. For 
parsimony, only those associated with the interactions between the dummies for before and after 
the Maastricht Treaty and the economic variables are reported.    
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Table 5. Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain 
 National values  Differences from EU-15 averages 
 FE  WLS  FE  WLS 
Before the MT        
  Before_MTit*Surplusit-1 0.09*  0.11**  -0.09*  -0.08 
 (3.16)  (2.55)  (-2.59)  (-0.82) 
  Before_MTit *Change_infit -0.05***  -0.07**  -0.032**  -0.02 
 (-5.89)  (-2.43)  (-4.06)  (-0.55) 
  Before_MTit *GDP_git-1 0.06**  0.03  -0.03  -0.08 
 (4.13)  (0.54)  (-0.38)  (-0.92) 
After the MT        
  After_MTit* Surplusit-1 0.04**  0.05**  0.05*  0.02 
 (5.23)  (1.98)  (2.45)  (0.46) 
  After_MTit*Change_infit 0.01  0.05  0.03  0.13 
 (0.64)  (0.75)  (0.34)  (1.41) 
  After_MTit*GDP_git-1 0.003  0.0009  -0.007  0.05 
 (0.13)  (0.02)  (-0.15)  (0.54) 
        
Observations 32  32  32  32 
Adj. R-squared 0.13  0.82  0.09  0.80 
Countries 4  4  4  4 
Notes:  T-statistics are between parentheses.   
 * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, significant at the 1% level.  
 The coefficients for country dummies are not reported. 
 The explanatory variables used in all specifications are the same as those reported in Table 2. For 
parsimony, only those associated with the interactions between the dummies for before and after 
the Maastricht Treaty and the economic variables are reported.    
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Appendix A 
 
Table A. Elections and first quarter of economic variables 
 
Variables GDP Inf Unemp Gov Net Lend Elections 
Austria 1960q1 1960q1 1993q1 1970 1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008 
Belgium 1960q1 1960q1 1970q1 1970 1971, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010 
Denmark 1960q1 1967q1 1982q1 1971 
1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 
2005, 2007, 2011 
Finland 1960q1 1960q1 1964q1 1970 1970, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 
France 1960q1 1960q1 1978q1 1978 1973, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007 
Germany 1960q1 1960q1 1992q1 1970* 1972, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009 
Greece 1960q1 1960q1 1998q2 1995 1974, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009 
Ireland 1960q1 1976q1 1982q1 1990 1973, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1987, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2011 
Italy 1960q1 1960q1 1979q4 1970 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008 
Luxemburg 1960q1 1960q1 1982q1 1990 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 
Netherlands 1960q1 1960q1 1970q1 1970 1971, 1972, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010 
Portugal 1960q1 1960q1 1983q1 1977 1979, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011 
Spain 1960q1 1960q1 1978q1 1970 1979, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 
Sweden 1960q1 1960q1 1970q1 1970 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 
United Kingdom 1960q1 1960q1 1971q1 1970 1970, 1974, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010 
* For West Germany from 1970 to 1990. 
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Appendix B. Averages for economic variables by time periods. 
Table B-1. Whole sample 
 Overall 
(1970-2011) 
Before the 
Maastricht Treaty 
(1970-1993) 
After the 
Maastricht Treaty 
(1994-2011) 
Recent crisis 
(2008-2011) 
Government net lending -2.91 -2.93 -2.89 -5.98 
Inflation  5.84 8.43 2.21 2.15 
Changes in inflation -.51 -.76 -.16 .63 
GDP growth 2.48 2.54 2.38 -.01 
  
Table B-2. Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain  
 Overall 
(1970-2011) 
Before the 
Maastricht Treaty 
(1970-1993) 
After the 
Maastricht Treaty 
(1994-2011) 
Recent crisis 
(2008-2011) 
Government net lending -5.43 -5.38 -5.46 -10.68 
Inflation  9.11 13.44 3.05 2.27 
Changes in inflation -1.50 -2.53 -.06 .86 
GDP growth 2.56 2.41 2.77 -.42 
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